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HIGHLIGHTS 
This study examines the current cattle feeding crisis in relation to the changing 
structure of cattle feeding that has accelerated since the previous cattle feeding cycles . 
Production and marketing economies do not suggest the feedlot structure as found in 
parts of the Plains and West. This study examines the financial advantages of large 
feedlots and of multi-lot firms controlling several feedlot plants. 
In effect, dispersal of risk has enabled cattle feeding firms to expand their size. 
Feedlots grew in size as custom cattle feeding arose to disperse ownership of cattle on feed 
in the firm. Many outside individuals own the cattle on feed within one firm. While 
ranchers and farmers own cattle on feed in custom feedlots, outside investors also have 
found cattle feeding beneficial. 
Investors in relatively high income tax brackets found cattle feeding a ready vehicle 
for deferring income from the current year into future periods when their other income 
and tax rate may be lower and thus allow a saving on total income taxes paid over time. 
The impact of the tax shelter investor on the industry may have deepened the present 
cattle feeding period of losses. 
The nontraditional investor in cattle feeding was the focus of public offerings of 
limited partnership funds in the national securities market. Feedlot firms of under 
30,000 head size were generally unable to justify the overhead expenses of these public 
investment offerings. Cattle feeding systems that dispersed risk widely were operational 
only for the relatively large size cattle feeding firm. 
As a result of the expanded size of feedlots in recent years, the cattle feeding industry 
is now much more concentrated than several years ago. USDA data show approximately 
2,000 feedlots produce over two-thirds of the nation's beef. However, individual firms 
are found to own more than one feedlot. Seventeen firms were noted to be supplying 
one-eighth of the nation's fed beef. Data based on 1972 levels showed three percent of the 
nation's fed beef being produced by two cattle feeding firms. 
Beyond the rising concentration in cattle feeding is the expanded role of the 
nontraditional cattle feeder. A consideration is the volatility of this outside capital. In 
total, outside investors were estimated to be financing one-fourth of our nation's fed beef 
in mid-1973. This sizeable block of investors in our nation's fed beef supply have only 
short-term contractual interests in cattle feeding, without ownership of feedlot facilities 
and supportive enterprises of breeding stock or feed grain production. In effect, the tax 
shelter contractual investor in cattle feeding may have made the structure of the industry 
highly dependent upon him for equity capital. This may leave the cattle feeding industry 
with another factor that further increases its instability and cyclical nature. 
If the outside investor will not continue in cattle feeding contracts, then the industry 
may take further structural shifts in order to disperse the risks of cattle feeding. Either the 
large firms could turn to feeding cattle for ranchers on contract, or merge into 
conglomerate-type operations to disperse financial risks of the firm owning the cattle on 
feed. If the large feedlots cannot continue to disperse market risk, then the smaller feedlot 
seCtor of the type found in the <::ornbelt may return to a more dominant role in cattle 
feeding. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This report is addressed not only to members of the cattle industry but also to all those 
citizens who are interested in the broader issues of structural change in agriculture. 
The cattle feeding industry is presently (mid 1974) going through such an economic 
crunch that numerous c.hanges are likely to be forthcoming that cannot be anticipated at 
this writing, even though the writers are attempting to be timely. Nevertheless, the 
material here should be useful in understanding how the industry has evolved to its 
present stage. 
Major structural shifts have occurred in the cattle feeding industry in recent years 
[12] . Because of this , one needs to ask if the 1973-74 bust in cattle prices is simply 
another recurrence of the age-old cattle feeding cycle of boom-bust or if new forces are at 
work in the industry? This study will trace the evolution of the present structure of cattle 
feeding, with particular emphasis over the past decade. In the decade since the last major 
cattle feeding financial collapse, the commercial sector of cattle feeding has seen dramatic 
changes in both size of feedlots and ownership of cattle on feed . These structural changes 
are related to the current cattle crisis . Also , it seems inevitable that the current cattle 
feeding crisis will affect the evolution of the structure of the cattle feeding industry. 
While more data are needed for understanding fully the relationship between structural 
change in the industry and the current cattle crisis, this overview of past developments 
provides a basis for further evaluation by those persons following the industry in the 
months ahead. The "commercial"b cattle feeding industry of the High Plains will be the 
main focus, because it has been the center of change in the past decade. 
CURRENT PROBLEMS 
The agricultural press is rife with accounts offeeding losses of $ 5 0 to $150 a head on 
cattle sold from October 1973 to the present . It is generally agreed that cattle feeders have 
experienced the worst set oflosses since 1953-54. Moreover, it is likely that ranchers and 
cow-calf producers will increasingly feel the brunt of these depressed conditions for many 
months ahead [6] . 
aMuch of this report is drawn from Dr. Meisner's Ph. D. disserration, Investor Capital, Taxes and the Structure 
of Cattle Feeding, University of Missouri, 1974 
bThe USDA practice of classifying lots of 1000 or more head one-time capacity as "commercial" is followed . 
Various factOrs have been proposed as contributing to the current problems of the 
cattle feeder . Of these the following have been cited by analysts: 
• rapidly rising feed grain prices in the past year greatly increasing the cost of 
feeding ; 
• continued high prices for feeder cattle in relation to feed prices and prices for 
finished cattle at the market; 
• repercussions from government handling of price controls that disrupted the 
continued flow of finished cattle to the market in late 1973; 
• other cost increases, such as removal of DES from feed rations and rising rates of 
interest. 
Only the second point is relevant to the thrust of this paper. It is, however, a most 
crucial point. Cattle feeders traditionally meet major cost increases by bidding down 
feeder cattle prices , and cutting output which leads to higher fed cattle prices . It is not 
much of an oversimplification to say that the feeding losses for the 10 months since 
September 1973 have reflected a striking failure of feeders to pursue these usual actions . 
This paper will argue that the unprofi table relationship of feeder and fed cattle prices 
was , in part, a result of the forces causing structural change. It should be emphasized that 
these structural forces are only part of the explanation. Market conditions were such as to 
promote over-optimism of cattle feeders. 
Price pressures continued upward on feeder cattle in spite of lower feeding margins 
because of a major factOr more recent to the industry: The large custom feedlots that 
dominated the feeding in the Plains and Western States, especially in the past decade, had 
a rapid growth from relatively recent investments by high income non-agricultural 
individuals. These nonfarm sources of funds were used to continue bidding for feeder 
cattle even when expected returns from feeding were already squeezed. The incentive 
of tax savings through income deferral from cattle feeding programs made 
expectations of even zero economic returns in cattle feeding attractive to the outside 
investor. As a further development, the cow-calf sector of the beef production system 
received relatively high prices for feeder cattle. This caused a further build-up in cow 
herds. Leaders in the cattle feeding industry warned in 1972 that the outside capital , with 
tax savings considerations, would likely disrupt the normal supply adjustment patterns of 
beef industry [5]. 
Now that cattle markets have faced major losses, will the future of cattle feeding 
continue as in recent years, with an increasing share of the nation's fed beef coming from 
the large feedlots of the Plains and West? 
Recent losses by custom cattle feeders-especially of the outside investor type--has 
led to a greater decline in new feeder cattle placements in the large commercial lots of 
Texas and Arizona than in the Cornbelt . The Cornbelt has the more traditional cattle 
feeders. 
If the major losses of equity in recent cattle feeding has wiped out many of the outside 
investors in the cattle feeding in the larger commercial lots of the Plains and West, who 
will take up the void now that they are gone? Will new tax shelter investors enter cattle 
feeding funds of the large lots as soon as profitable margins return to the industry? 
A further question is will more attractive investment alternatives arise for nonfarm 
investors formerly in cattle feeding and take them from supplying fed beef in the future? 
If so, will large size feedlots seek to merge with other firms in a conglomerate to absorb or 
cushion the risks of cattle feeding and thus further change the control over the nation's fed 
beef? These questions cannot all be answered at this time. However, a fuller 
understanding of the structural evolution in cattle feeding will aid one in anticipating 
future changes that may unfold over the months ahead. 
THE STRUCTURAL EVOLUTION 
Summary Factors Accounting for Rapid Change. Three major factors explain this 
remarkable evolution, which has few if any, parallels in agriculture. 
(1) A large and steady increase in demand for fed beef the past 20 years created the 
opportunity for a big expansion in cattle feeding, and a generally quite profitable 
climate [9, p.2] . 
(2) Large increases in the feed grain surpluses produced in the High Plains (Texas, 
particularly), associated with the rapid development of irrigation and the availability 
of new hybrid milos , led that area to develop livestock feeding locally as a market for 
its grain. Without that base of feed grains, there would be much less cattle feeding in 
the High Plains and a much less concentrated feeding industry [7]. 
(3) The successive capture of three types of small but significant economic advantages by 
the large, commercial lots. 
The rapid growth of the big commercial lots in the High Plains since 1960 was the 
product of an opportunity spawned by enterpreneurs in a region with rapidly increasing 
feed surpluses. It is hardly surprising that the vehicle used was not family-farm-feeding, 
which had little precedent in the area, but rather the commercial lot, transplanted from 
several years of successful use on the West Coast. Established firms and financial interests, 
along with others , built with astonishing speed a commercial feeding industry in this 
new area. a Since practically all of the growth o{the High Plains feeding was in com-
merciallots and, conversely, since most of the growth of commercial lots was in the High 
Plains, it is very difficult to separate analytically the competitive geographical (feed, 
climate, etc.) advantages of the High Plains from those of the big commercial lots. 
For most of the growth period of the commercial lots in the High Plains, that area 
has had cheaper feed prices than the Corn Belt, although the differential has become very 
narrow in recent years. Nevertheless this regional advantage of cheaper feed was quite 
important. 
Economic Advantages of Large Commercial Lots. The first and perhaps the least 
important economic advantage of the large lots was production economies of size. While 
the numerous studies of production economies of scale have not been in ~otal agreement, 
it is clear that such scale economies do not explain the growth of numerous individual lots 
to sizes in excess of 32,000 nor of multi-lot firms. b A 1970 summary of such studies by 
Gustafson and Van Arsdall concluded that most economies in nonfeed costs are achieved 
at capacities of5 ,000 to 7,500 head [17]. Some studies find small, additional cost savings 
up to 25,000 head or so. Apparently, there is a very wide range offeedlot sizes in which 
average production costs are really quite similar, but the commercial lot of 5,000 to 
25,000 head probably has some small cost advantage in non-feed COStS over the 
farmer-feeder. [18] However, these non-feed costs are less than 20 percent of the COStS (not 
even considering the costs of the feeder cattle), so they could easily be dwarfed by 
differences in feed costs. 
"Thus, commercial fed cattle production in the case of the area served by the Southwestern Public Service 
Company of Amarillo, Tx. grew from a few thousand head in 1960 to 1,210,000 in 1966 and to 4,963,000 
in 1973. 
bFeedlots of 32 ,000 head size and larger produced 19 percent of the narion's fed beef in 1973. 
The second economic advantage was the marketing advantage of size. It is obviously 
cheaper for a packer buyer to travel 20 miles to a big lot and bid on 500 cattle than to 
travel 100 miles to a farmlot and bid on 50 head. 
Packer buyers in the High Plains commercial feeding area can travel fewer miles and 
buy more cattle per buyer than in Corn Belt farmer-feeder areas . The cost saving is 
small-probably in the range of$.50 to $ 1.00 per head. In a competitive national market 
for fed cattle , presumably some or all of that saving is passed back to the cattle feeders. 
The third advantage was the ability of the large lot to attract customers who would 
pay well for feedlot services while assuming much of the feeding risks. Explanation of this 
third economic advantage of the large custOm lot requires a more extended examination of 
this practice from the viewpoints of both the lot and the custOmer. 
Custom Feeding. The practice of custOm feeding greatly facilitated the rapid structural 
evolution of cattle feeding . CustOm feeding enabled feedlots to pass much of the burden of 
capital provision and risk-bearing to their customers. A 25,000 head lot will require an 
investment in facilities of approximately $1 , 250,000. To own the cattle and feed would 
require another $ 10,000,000 or more depending upon cattle and feed prices . In addition 
to the large capital requirements of owning all the cattle in a large lot is the very 
important consideration of risks . Large size feedlots have tended to depend upon custom 
feeding for outside investOrs as a method to spread risk and utilize the feedlot's heavy 
investment in fixed plant and equipment. As feedlots increased in size a higher 
percentage of the cattle were generally custOm fed. 
Texas studies of the state's major commercial feeding area found that two-thirds of the 
cattle on feed in 1966-67 were owned by custOmers rather than the feedlots , and that by 
1969-70 nine-tenths were customer-owned [3,p.6]. 
Studies during the 1960's generally found a relatively close correlation between 
feedlot size and the percentage of its cattle being custom-fed for individuals not associated 
with the ownership of the feedlot. 
The cattle feeding movement grew rapidly in the plains through the 1960's. Growing 
lots initially began custom feeding for neighboring ranchers and farmers . In time , 
individuals from nonfarm pursuits joined with the farmers and ranchers in feeding cattle. 
Types of custom cattle feeders. CustOm feeding during the era of rising demand and 
generally high profits has been attractive to many people who had some investment funds 
and some acquaintance with the industry. Local professional men and merchants were 
often willing to invest some money. There were even a few professional feeders who did 
nothing else, and counted on large personal as~ets and considerable industry acumen co 
weather the occasional losses. Then there were the owners, managers , and chief employees 
of the feedlots who often became custOmers. 
The custom cattle feedlot provided a full line of order buying, feed purchases, 
medicinal treatment, and final marketing services for the nonagricultural investOr who 
had sufficient investment money but lacked cattle feeding know-how. 
CONCENTRATION IN CATTLE FEEDING 
While concentration in cattle feeding is rather small by many industrial standards, it 
is very large compared to most of agriculture. Moreover the change has occurred swiftly. 
In 1962, the commercial cattle feeders fed about one-third of the fed cattle; in 1973 , they 
fed two-thirds (see table). This dramatic increase in the market share of the commercial 
Lot Capacity 
in Head 
Under 1000 
1000 - 3,999 
4000 - 31,999 
32,000 and over 
Total 
National Feedlot Structure, 1962 and 1973 
Number of Lots Cattle Marketed (000 head) 
1962 1973 1962 1973 
234 ,646 144,380 9,045 8,968 
1,186 1,336 1,723 2,425 
326 635 3,419 9,105 
5 69 314 4,833 
236,163 146,420 14,501 25,331 
Calculated from statistics in Number of Feedlots by Size Groups and Number of Fed Cattle Marketed 
1962-64, USDA-SRS-9 , June 1966, and Cattle on Feed, USDA-SRS, Jan. 18, 1974. 
feedlots was obscured by a rapidly growing total production of fed beef. In brief, the total 
numbers fed by farmer-feeders remained unchanged 1962-73, while the total numbers 
fed by commercial feeders rose more than 200% . 
Concentration in cattle feeding is reported by size of feedlots. Concentration by size of 
firm is more meaningful. The nation's supply of beef is now more concentrated than data 
on feedlot plant sizes suggest. USDA data show approximately 2,000 feedlots produce 
over two-thirds of the nation's beef [2]. However, a few multi-lot firms control a 
surprisingly large fraction of national output. Two multi-lot firms supply three percent of 
the nation's fed beef. One of these firms has announced plans co supply five percent of the 
nation's fed beef in the future . Seventeen firms supply one-eighth of the nation's beef[ 11, 
p. 189]. 
In addition to this concentrated level of horizontal integration, some vertical 
integration continues. Physical and financial inputs are controlled by these vertically 
integrated firms. A few major cattle feeding firms control fed beef production from the 
intermediate growth stage of the animal on through slaughter. Feedlot firms even provide 
direct loans to investors in custom feeding in some cases through financial subsidiaries 
[11 , pp. 173-177,198-201]. 
EVOLUTION IN CUSTOMER CAPITAL 
To achieve a more nearly average price, the practice of a customer placing a pen on 
feed every month was encouraged. For example, one study shows that a cuscomer which 
marketed cattle in each of the 108 months, 1960-1968, would have averaged a positive 
return for the whole period of about $15 a head before cost of interest for debt capital, but 
would have experienced losses in 32 of the 108 months, including losses for 10 
consecutive months in 1963-64 [11, p. 296]. 
This so-called "dollar averaging" practice required as much as $50,000 to $ 125,000 
total capital, as the normal feeding time was 5 or 6 months, and pens often held 100 to 
250 head. Such large capital requirements encouraged the pooling of capital into cattle 
feeding clubs. These clubs, operated much like stock investment clubs, were frequently 
composed of 10 or so investors who each contributed $ 5,000 or more of equity capital and 
borrowed the resc. 
The cattle feeding club enabled relatively small investors to enter cattle feeding . The 
cattle clubs developed in the mid and late 1960's along with the continued rise of cattle 
feeding by higher income individuals, such as business and professional men. These 
sources of outside capital coming into cattle feeding in the Southern Plains area appeared 
relatively significant in the late 1960's. 
A Texas study found in 1969-70 that 57 percent of the custom cattle were owned by 
farmers and ranchers, 19 percent by feedlot officers and directors (which often included 
local merchants , bankers and professional men), almost 9 percent by packers , and 15 
percent by others (including feeding clubs, professional men, etc.) [3, p . 6]. The 
problems of occupational classification are considerable, of course, because those of 
sufficient economic substance to be cattle feeders are quite likely to be in several 
businesses often including ranching or farming. 
The rise of these various investors helped fuel feedlot expansion as commercial lots 
found investor demand for more and more pens of cattle. The trade press traces the 
expansion programs of existing feedlots and new feedlot plans across the Southern Plains 
through the late 1960's [1 ,4] . 
As the commercial feeding industry grew in the late 1960's, it began to outrun the 
combined equity capital of these customers, even though many participants far from the 
local area were already involved. Excess feedlot expansion emerged in 1969 when Texas 
feedlot capacity rose from 1.1 million to 2.0 million head during that year. The 
consequent under-utilization in 1970 led to some financial failures of feedlots, numerous 
mergers, and an intensified search for new sources of customer capital with which to fill 
the feedlots. 
Feedlot utilization levels are important to feedlot profitability. A 1969-70 Texas 
study notes that, "One of the major contributors of lower annual fixed costs per pound of 
gain is the level of feedlot utilization rate. The ability of commercial feedlot operators to 
maintain high levels of feedlot utilization rates , thereby spreading annual fixed cOStS over 
greater units of Output, has been an important factor in the growth and expansion of 
custom feeding in the Texas Panhandle"[3, p. 16]. 
Other forces occured in the late 1960's that caused demand for more equity than the 
area could readily provide for cattle feeding. On a macroeconomic level, the nation was 
facing a tight money policy by the banks in order to curb inflation. As a result lending 
practices by banks were tightened up . This caused lenders to seek to reduce the degree of 
risk in their loans . Therefore, a greater equity base was called for to support a given level 
of debt capital. In effect, this tightening of credit by banks in the late 1960's at the same 
time that the feedlots of the Southern Plains had over-expanded, caused individual feedlot 
managers to scramble for a broader equity base [4] . 
Another feature of the next stage in financing of cattle on feed was the institutional 
system in use in the Southern Plains for financing the relatively high risk petroleum well 
drilling programs. The Southern Plains area was experienced in tapping national risk 
capital markets for oil well drilling enterprises. This industry utilized the limited 
partnership form of business investment to attract equity capital from individuals having 
no direct knowledge or association with the industry. 
Still other forces developing in the late 1960's brought outside investors to cattle 
feeding. In the late 1960's when an overexpanded feedlot industry in the Southern Plains 
sought a broader base of equity capital to finance cattle on feed, urban investors were 
finding returns on Wall Street relatively unattractive. These investors were seeking other 
avenues for investment. Futhermore, tax sheltered investments became more inviting as 
inflated incomes pushed more individuals into relatively high marginal tax brackets . 
Limited partnerships and tax shelters. New sources of customer capital were found in 
distant financial centers among investors who often knew virtually nothing about cattle 
feeding and usually never saw the cattle they owned. Most of these investors were 
attracted by twO aspects of custom feeding: it had had a generally profitable history , and it 
offered a form of tax shelter to people in the upper reaches of the income tax brackets. 
Large investors in cattle feeding of, say, $50,000 or more would often deal directly 
with the feedlot in setting up feeding arrangements. However, beginning in 1969, some 
of the larger feedlot firms began public sale of limited partnership funds that would 
attract a mass of individual investments typically in the $5,000 to $20,000 range . 
CostS are high for developing and managing publically offered limited partnerships. 
Costs of offering these public limited partnership funds can run above $150,000 in fees 
for accountants and lawyers for preparing and filing the prospectus with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. A portion of these COSts go to investment underwriters for 
promoting the fund to investment clients. Only the large size feedlot operations (of 
30,000 and up) can consider such funds as practical, considering the costs of their 
development. Even a 30,000 to 40,000 head feedyard would be marginal in size for 
supporting the overhead costs for operating a cattle feeding fund [10,16]. 
These publically-offered limited partnerships enable the larger feedlots to reach out to 
many small investors unacquainted with cattle feeding as investment [8]. Investment 
underwriters and their agents with skill in marketing common stocks, bonds and mutual 
funds offer these public limited partnership funds to their clients. As noted earlier, in the 
late 1960's, investment underwriters and agents sought new investments to offer their 
clientele in the aftermath of depressed returns from common stocks. 
Again limited partnership investments offer the incentive of tax advantages to the 
high income individual seeking an investment . Individuals investing in such programs 
generally are required to have the following financial security: 
• net worth of over $50,000 (exclusive of automobile, home and furnishings), 
• federal income tax bracket of 50 percent or above and, 
• no more than 15 percent of annual gross income invested in the program. [ 19] 
An attraction of cattle feeding for the high income investor lies in the use of prepaid 
expenses at the beginning of a cattle feeding program for shifting current income into a 
future tax year. 
A West Coast Cattle Feedlot Consultant, Tim Runner, describes the tax advantages 
of cash accounting for cattle feeding as follows: 
A special cash basis method of accounting is available to farming businesses 
(which include cattle.) This method enables the investor to declare expenses as 
they are paid and to declare income only when it is received. In other words, 
the costs of caring for and feeding cattle can be expenses as they are paid , and 
the income is taxable only after it is received. [15, p. 55] 
Thus prepaying for feed and other expenses of feeding cattle can allow relatively heavy 
deductions from one's current year's income. This allows the investor in cattle feeding 
programs to create heavy expenses in latter parts of a year of relatively high income. The 
returns on the program are deferred until a later year, when further planning for deferring 
income and/or taxes can again be arranged. In the meantime, the investor in the relatively 
high income tax bracket has been allowed to invest money that would otherwise be paid in 
taxes, in effect receiving a "loan" which is interest-free and which isn't repaid if the 
invested money is lost. 
Deferring income and income taxes by way of prepaying expenses in the current year 
of relatively high income through investing in cattle feeding programs can allow the 
investor one or more of the following advantages: [15, p . 61-64] 
• receiving the income in a later year of relatively lower income (or even when 
retired) when taxes upon the income returned from the investment would thus be 
lower. 
• defer income until later arranging for reinvestment of the returns in other tax 
shelters of a longer-term nature, such as real estate. 
The high income investor with relatively heavy income tax deductions for feed 
expenses when beginning a cattle feeding investment has a lower risk of loss than the 
lower income investOr. Any losses are shared in part with the U.S. Treasury, i.e. income 
taxes deferred are not required to be paid if the investment suffers sufficient losses . This 
risk sharing with the government by the higher income investOr may cause him to assume 
greater before-tax risk in cattle feeding through higher borrowing in relation to his equity 
in the investment. Such higher debt to equity ratios can make cattle feeding exceptionally 
profitable to these high income investOrs. This point may be clarified by a brief review of 
the possible levels of debt financing allowed for cattle feeding. 
Leveraged profits and losses. 
With cattle readily marketable, cattle feeding is allowed relatively high levels of debt 
financing by lending institutions . Banks generall y lend about two-thirds of the cost of the 
feeder cattle plus all of the cost of the feed; this represents a loan of75 to 80 percent of the 
animal's COSt when it reaches slaughter weight [16]. This suggests a leveraging level of 
3:1 and 4:l. 
Leveraging generally magnifies profits or losses. Whenever the rate of interest on 
borrowed capital is lower than the rate of return to total capital, leveraging increases 
the returns on the investor's equity capital. For example, on reasonable assumptions 
about cattle feeding, a rate of return to equity of 12.5% with no borrowed capital would 
have been 19.5% with a 2: 1 leverage, and 26.5% with a 4: 1 leverage (See Appendix A). 
However, higher debt to equity financing, with its required fixed interest payments 
deducted before showing returns to equity, can increase the number of periods showing 
losses in the short-run even while increasing the level of returns to equity over the long-
run . For example, the study referred to above showed 32 months of losses in the 108 
months 1960-68 when an unleveraged investment, but 41 months when leveraged 4: 1 
[11, pp. 296, 310]. 
More important for the present account of structural impacts is that leveraging 
increased the risk of ruin oflimited partnerships. A relatively thin equity base can be fully 
eroded in an unprofitable cattle market over a few months. The arithmetic is fairly 
simple. With a 4: 1 leverage, the investOr has $100 of his own and $400 borrowed in a 
$500 animal ready for market. If the market forces are such that the animal sells for $100 
less than its costs of purchase plus feeding, the owner has lost his entire equity [11, pp. 
310-317] . 
As alluded to earlier, to reduce this risk of loss, many cattle feeders seek to market 
with relative frequency throughout a year. A major purpose of marketing each month, 
is to minimize the chances of such losses. A loss for one particular month can 
be offset by profits for other months, thus enabling the cattle feeding investment 
to continue to show a profit. However, this technique protects against only 
month-to-month price fluctuations . It gives no relief to prolonged low prices. If one's 
capital is spread over 5 or 6 pens of cattle marketed in as many consecutive months and if 
the market is continuously bad for this period, then the entire equity capital invested 
in the cattle feeding is lost [11, pp. 310-317]. 
The ability of the cattle feeder to re-enter the cattle market is crucial ifhe is to recoup 
his losses. It is generally characteristic of the outside investOr types of cattle feeders 
(participating in the formal limited partnership funds of the large size feedlot firms) that 
they have only a minor fraction of their investment capital in cattle feeding. Additionally, 
their household living expenses are provided by other sources of income. Thus, in even 
such a run oflosses over a period of six months or more, these outside investors are usually 
financially able to replace their capital and continue or re-enter a cattle feeding operation 
if they wish. Furthermore, investOrs using cattle feeding as a tax shelter will typically 
offset cattle feeding losses against other income and thus greatly reduce the amount of 
their after tax loss . The critical question is not theability of the outside investOr to re-enter 
but his willingness to do so. 
PRESENT PROSPECTS FOR THE STRUCTURE OF CATTLE FEEDING 
The eq~ity base of some of the large size feedlot systems operating with funds of the 
outside investOr (via limited partnerships) has now been depleted completely with the 
relatively heavy cattle feeding losses of late 1973 and early 1974. This is not to say that 
the investors in those funds may not decide to invest in new limited partnerships to feed 
more cattle. The following crucial questions arise at this time. Is there likely to be a short 
period in which such investments in limited partnerships are very small because of the bad 
publicity of large losses?a Will the promoters find it easier to recruit a new group of 
investors than to get further investments from many of today's losers? 
Those feedlots which depended most upon outside investment capital appear 
currently to be the emptiest. However, with the exception of a few feedlots which have 
long done an outstanding job for a very solid group of customers, most custom lots are 
suffering from a lack of customers. Many large lots may be partially empty this fall and 
winter for lack of customers. 
Will the Corn-belt feeders be able to take up the slack and assume the role offeeding 
the numbers of cattle that would normally be fed in the larger commercial lots west of the 
Missouri River? With relatively high prices for their scarce supplies of corn, can the 
Cornbelt farmer be expected to expand cattle feeding in the immediate months ahead? A 
further question regards the ownership of the large commercial feedlots. Many have 
merged into multi-lot operations . Some of these joined in conglomerate movements with 
the petroleum industry of the Southern Plains. If outside investors do not continue to 
utilize cattle feeding as an attractive investment, who will own the cattle on feed? 
Without relatively sizeable utilization levels, the larger commercial feedlots may face 
further financial squeezes and go to new ownership. In effect, cattle feeding may take 
three directions: 
a) continuation of farmer and rancher owned cattle on feed in their own individual 
feedlots as characterizes most of the cattle feeding of the Cornbelt states; 
b) continuation of commercial custom feeding for nonagricultural investors and farmer 
and rancher customers; 
c) movement toward ownership of feedlots and cattle by firms having broad equity bases 
that allow ample risk capital and reduction of risk through diversification. 
a Remember, however, that an investor in the 50% bracket shared his losses 50:50 with IRS. 
While all three methods of feeding cattle now exist, commercial custom feeding for 
the outside investor was greatly on the rise in recent months before the 1973-74 cattle 
price bust. The relative share of cattle fed by the above three operations is likely to 
undergo change in the recovery period from the current cattle crisis. 
LONG RUN CONSIDERA TrONS 
What about the longer run prospects? These prospects are for continued growth of the 
commercial lots, although probably at a slower rate. The physical facilities will still be 
there , even if some of the owners sell out or go bankrupt. The financial squeeze in the late 
1960's led to mergers into stronger hands. Past patterns suggest that a feeding industry 
will emerge within twO or three years that is even more concentrated as far as both size of 
lots and firms [11, p. 204] . 
Over time, the outside investors may continue a major role . Unless there is tax reform 
legislation which deters the tax write off of current farm costs (feed and interest in this 
case) , against current non-farm income, the high income investor is likely to be back into 
cattle feeding . Since such high-income outside investors can accept lower economic 
returns because of savings on taxes from cattle feeding than the farmer-rancher and can 
pass a greater share of any losses to the tax collector, they are very tough competitors for all 
other cattle feeders . 
In simple terms, high income investors who use cattle feeding as a tax shelter have an 
indirect subsidy that brings them attractive returns from cattle feeding when the 
economic profit margins to the industry are not attractive. In brief, it is hard to compete 
against tax-subsidized investments. 
To restate the preceding paragraph, in more formal economic terms, tax incentive 
advantages of tax shelter investments lower the risk and raise the returns to the investor. 
These advantages lead over time to greater investment levels than otherwise , and in turn 
tend to reduce the long run returns to cattle feeding . Over time , the before-tax returns to 
cattle feeding would fall. Traditional agricultural-based cattle feeders without sufficient 
income from other sources to offset the risk of/osses or to make cattle feeding investments 
useful for income averaging and tax savings are likely to continue to withdraw from cattle 
feeding . Therefore, entry into cattle feeding and continuance by feedlot firms presently in 
it will be limited to those able to attract risk capital in a regional or national market . The 
larger firms have the ability to attract the broad equity base essential to the bearing of 
cattle feeding risks. Investors with high income from other sources will likely bear the 
risks of cattle feeding . 
INDUSTRY STABIUTY AND EFFICIENCY 
However, it must be realized that depending upon the non-agricultural investor for 
financing the nation's fed beef is a highly unstable source of supply in contrast to the more 
traditional farm and ranch cattle feeding sector. Attractive investment alternatives in 
petroleum, real estate or common stocks can cause a major decline of outside investors in 
cattle feeding programs. As a result , the supply of cattle on feed and the cattle price 
pattern may be more volatile in the future than in the past years . The causes lie in the 
additional influences of a highly volatile investment sector that may enter and exit from 
cattle feeding as returns appear more or less favorable than nonagricultural investment 
alternatives . 
It is obvious that present income tax policy is aiding the larger cattle feeding firm . As 
regards economic efficiency, subsidizing beef production can distort cattle feedlot sizes 
away from those most efficient in production . Instead of competing solely on the basis of 
least cost production, feedlot firms compete in part upon ability to obtain risk capital 
from investors of high income who require less risk premium because of tax advantages . 
Subsidies to large-size feedlot firms , indirect though they be, would tend to lead to 
survival and growth of those firms on a basis of other than economic efficiency. This 
matter gains in importance as beef continues to assume a larger proportion of the 
consumer food dollar and agriculture's income. If the nation seeks to subsidize beef 
production, direct grants to feedlot firms is an alternative. Then, true economic costs of 
the subsidies would be more apparent. However, in a world of growing concern for energy 
supplies, the beef industry would seem to be a most unlikely recipient of national 
subsidy . 
IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER COMMODITIES 
Generalizations to other commodities must be cautious: agriculture is not one 
industry but many. 
First, the rapidity of structural evolution in cattle feeding was due to a unique 
combination of circumstances which are not likely to be found in other major agricultural 
commodities. 
Second, wherever in agriculture there is an opportunity to postpone income taxes or 
to convert income to capital gains, there will be investors who are interested. To convert 
that investor interest into actual investments ordinarily requires a go-between-a 
promoter. In cattle feeding, the large feedlots found it to their advantage to become the 
promoter. In cattle raising, specialist promoter firms have arisen to take advantage of the 
opportunities . As agriculture becomes more industrialized (i.e., more like the rest of the 
economy), the perceived opportunities will multiply for the promoters of tax-shelter 
investments in many phases of agriculture. 
While the limited partnership has been demonstrated to be an excellent vehicle for 
the promotion of such investments, it is not the only possible link. The Subchapter S 
corporation is being used to bring investor money into large hog farrowing units [13]. 
Direct contacts between large investors and large agricultural operations can bypass the 
limited partnership. 
Third, a structural revolution in an agricultural sector may have only a very tenuous 
relation to productive efficiency. The impressive advantages of the High Plains feedlots 
have been financial ones rather than any decisive edge in productive efficiency. Tax reform 
would not eliminate the present structure of cattle feeding and restOre the previous one. 
However, tax reform might help to keep competition in other agricultural commodities 
more on the basis of productive efficiency. 
Fourth, the evolution of an agricultural industry into more financially sophisticated 
hands and larger firms does not guarantee the macro stability of that industry. The recent 
price patterns in the broiler, turkey and egg industry suggest that the highly 
concentrated poultry industry has not overcome the ills that were thought to vanish once 
poultry was no longer widely dispersed amid many relatively small producing units. The 
current crisis of the cattle feeding industry is perhaps more heightened by its current 
structure rather than being cushioned. A dispersed cattle feeding system into many 
relatively small units would suggest a more rapid adjustment of risk capital for cattle 
feeding than a concentrated specialized feedlot system that must look to the highly 
sophisticated urban investor who can readily channel capital into various alternative 
investments, from petroleum well drilling, to real estate and common stocks. In a nation 
of consumers that are concerned about the stability of their food supplies, that lesson 
should not be forgotten [14] . 
REFERENCES 
1. Amarillo Globe News, Amarillo, Texas . Special files of Western Beef. 
2. Cattle on Feed. Crop Reporting Board, SRS, USDA, MtAn 2-1 (1-74) . WashingtOn, 
D.C. : United States Department of Agriculture, January 1974. 
3. Dietrich, Raymond A., Martin,J .R . , Ljungdahl, P. W. The Capital Structure and 
Financial Management Practices of the Texas Cattle Feeding Industry . Texas A & M 
Univ., Tex . Agr. Exper. Sta., B-1128 . College Station, Texas: December 
1972. 
4. Fleming, Bill. "Those Texans are Building Again." Bee/, (OctOber 1972), 12, 15. 
5. "Funny Money' Draws Warning." Beef, (OctOber 1972), 17. 
6. Grimes , Glenn , "Fed Cattle Outlook," Paper presented at Midwest Agricultural 
Outlook Conference, Ames, Iowa, August 14, 1974. 
7. Langemeier, Larry N, "A Spatial Equilibrium Analysis to Determine the Optimum 
Location of Cattle Feeding in the United States under Various Constraint 
Specifications." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Agricultural Economics 
Department, University of Missouri, Columbia, 1968. 
8. "Limited Partnership is Termed Good for Investor and Feeder. " Beef, (May 1973), 
36. 
9. Livestock and Meat Statistics. USDA, ERS, SRS, Agricultural Marketing Service, 
Statistical Bulletin No. 522 . WashingtOn, D . c. : United States Department of 
Agriculture , July 1973 . 
10. Matthews, Stephen F. "The Limited Partnership as an Investment Vehicle in 
Agriculture." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation. Agricultural Economics 
Department, University of Missouri , Columbia, 1974. 
11. Meisner, Joseph C. "Investor Capital, Taxes and the Structure of Cattle Feeding ," 
Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation. Agricultural Economics Department, 
University of Missouri , Columbia, 1974. 
12. Rhodes , V. James. "Structure of Cattle Feeding and the Role of Custom Lots." 
University of Missouri-Columbia, Agricultural Economics Paper No. 197 1-
72. 
13. Rhodes, V. James, Finley, Robert M., Grimes , Glenn. A 1974 Survey of Large-Scale 
Hog Production in the u.s. Mo. Ag. Exp. Sta. Special Report SR-165 , 
September, 1974. 
14. Rhodes, V. James, and Kyle, Leonard R. "A Corporate Agriculture ." Number 3 of a 
series of 6. In Who Will Control U.S. Agriculture? University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign, College of Agriculture, Cooperative Extension Service, 
Special Publication 28. North Central Regional Extension Publication 32-1 
through 32-6. March 1973. 
15. Runner, Tim. Cattle Investments. Redlands, California, Cattle Publication, 1973. 
16. Simpson , F. Howard. "Cattle Feeding Funds Expect Good Future After Slow 1970 
Start ." Investment Dealer's Digest (February 1971), 1-2. (Material is available as 
a reprint from Western Beef, Inc., Amarillo, Texas.) 
17. Gustafson, Ronald and Roy Van Arsdall, Cattle Feeding in the United States. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Agriculture, AER No. 186, 
October, 1970. 
18. Wilson, Charles M. "Financing the Cattle Feeding Industry in the High Plains ." 
Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (September 1969), 3-9. 
19. Youde , James G. and Carman, Hoy F. "Will Tax Shelter Laws Wreck CustOm 
Feeding?" Beef. (October 1972), 16-17 . 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Anyone interested in the question of who will control U. S. agriculture will be 
interested in the continuing evolution ofU .S. cattle feeding [14]. Cattle feeding is in the 
midst of a dramatic increase in concentration. The cause-agents of change are complex, 
but mainly do not involve vertical integration as was instrumental in the broiler industry. 
Tax reform is the instrument of public policy which might be most significant in slowing 
down further concentration. This changing industry may be a precedent for some other 
agricultural commodities. Indeed, the tax shelter instrument of the limited partnership is 
being tried in egg and hog production and in several specialty crops. 
The current crisis in the cattle feeding industry encourages examination of the 
structural evolution that has accelerated in the industry in recent years . The beef to satisfy 
the increasing demand in the past decade was provided in large part by a great increase in 
the number and size of commercial custom feedlots, particularly in the Plains. With the 
rise of the many large size feedlots of the Plains, firms sought a broadened supply of equity 
capital to finance the cattle on feed. The earlier practices of custom cattle feeding by the 
larger feedlots reached out beyond the professional cattle feeders, the farmer-rancher 
sector, and even the cattle feeding clubs that helped bring in the smaller outside investOr. 
Business and professional men turned to cattle feeding as an investment. 
The over-expansion of the industry in the late 1960's, encouraged mergers into 
multi-lot operations and the feedlot promotion of limited partnership equity funds . 
These funds were promoted nationally and helped fuel the rapid expansion of the feedlot 
firms. Now that cattle feeding is facing a crisis, the question arises as to the effects of these 
two new characteristics of the industry: (1) concentration of cattle feeding into fewer 
firms, and (2) heavy financing by nonagricultural investors. 
The rapid influx of the outside investOr grew in part because cattle feeding served as 
an attractive tax shelter. The investor who faced the possibility of deferring income and 
taxes, found the industry attractive even when cattle feeding profits were relatively low. 
Thus, it appears that large lots fueled by outside investment propelled the cattle feeding 
industry into even further expansion in the early 1970's at a time when cattle feeding 
returns , without tax considerations, did not warrant it. We do not wish to explain all of 
the crisis by these structural forces. It is realized that the forces of inflation, along with 
unusual conditions in the world markets for grain and meat, deterred a recognition of the 
potential losses facing the industry in the past year. 
Now as the industry finds at least a temporary reduction of the major role of the large 
commercial lots feeding for the outside investOr in mid-1974, the question arises as to 
who will feed the nation's beef in the coming year. It appears at this time that placement 
of feeder cattle is holding up better in the Cornbelt farmer feeder area than in the 
commercial feedlots utilizing outside investor equity capital for financing the cattle on 
feed. However, relatively high corn prices this year further complicate the possibility of 
the Cornbelt expanding into feeding more of the nation's current calf crop. Over the 
months ahead, as grain and cattle prices return to clearer patterns, the question remains as 
to the role of the large commercial feedlots. Both their ownership and their sources of 
equity for the cattle on feed may assume new forms. In the meantime, continued 
evaluation of the future structural shifts in cattle feeding and the current cattle crisis 
merits consideration 'by consumer and producer alike. 
APPENDIX A 
EFFECT OF LEVERAGE UPON RETURNS TO EQUITY 
To simplify that analysis of the effect of varying the equity to debt levels in cattle on 
teed, a total investment of $300 per head is assumed. It will be further assumed that the 
cattle inventory is completely turned each 150 days or five months, for 2.4 turns per year. 
Interest COSt is assumed to be 9 percent. 
To generalize the effect ofleveraging levels upon the returns to equity, Hopkin , Barry 
and Baker have developed the following formula. a 
Consider profit as a return to capital invested minus interest cost for debt capital. 
Let Profits = (rA - iD) 
r = returns on total capital 
A = asset value, representing total capital per unit 
= interest rate 
D debt capital 
Dollar returns are transformed into percentage returns to equity by the following: 
Rate of return to Equity Capital =rA - iD 
E = equity E 
Assume the following three leverage levels of debt to equity . 
a) no debt capital , i.e . , $300 investment per head of cattle as equity 
b) debt capital of $200, equity of $ 100 for 2: 1 ratio 
c) Debt capital ·of $240, equity of $60 for 4: 1 ratio 
For the above assumptions of leverage levels, the following returns to equity are calcu-
lated: 
Rate of Return to Equity Capital = rA - iD 
E 
a) RREC = 12.5 ($300) - 9 (0) = 12.5 percent 
$300 
b) RREC = 12.5 ($300) - 9($200) = 
$100 
$37 .5 - $18 
$100 
c) RREC = $12 .5 ($300) - 9 ($240) 
$37.50 = $21.60 
$60 
$ 15.90 
$60 
= 19.5 percent 
= 26.5 percent 
By leveraging the investment to a 2: 1 debt to equity ratio , the returns to equity were 
raised from 12.5 to 19.5 percent. A doubling of the debt to equity ratio to 4: 1 raised the 
returns another 7 percent to 26.5 percent return on equity. 
a John A. Hopkin, Peter J. Barry and C. B. Baker, Financial Management in Agriculture (Danville, Illinois: 
Interstate Printers and Publishers , Inc. , 1973), p. 149. 
